NO. 104470-4

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

FAAFETAI SANTISTEBAN,

Petitioner,

v.

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES,

Respondent.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Court of Appeals reached two unremarkable conclusions in its unpublished decision. First, a court must acquire personal jurisdiction over an entity before compelling it to pay money. Second, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), RCW 34.05, provides the exclusive mechanism for challenging agency action. Both conclusions are consistent with long-established law. And the merits issues that Petitioner relies on here are not presented in the case's current procedural posture. Petitioner can raise those issues on remand, after ensuring that the Court acquires personal jurisdiction over the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS).

In this case, the Snohomish County Prosecutor's Office and an attorney representing a not guilty by reason of insanity acquittee asked the superior court to enter an order unlawfully binding a nonparty, DSHS. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the fundamental requirement of personal jurisdiction, correctly applied the APA, and reversed the

challenged sections of the conditional release order. In reversing portions of the order, the Court of Appeals correctly applied *State v. G.A.H.*, 133 Wn. App. 567, 137 P.3d 66 (2006), in which the court held that a nonparty state agency cannot be ordered to act without personal jurisdiction or a specific statutory duty. Because the court decided the case on procedural grounds, the court properly declined to reach the merits of Ms. Santisteban's alleged due process violation.

In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly applied *G.A.H.* to conclude that DSHS was allowed to appeal as an "aggrieved party" under RAP 3.1, despite not being a party in the superior court. The court recognized DSHS's status as an aggrieved party with significant pecuniary interest in the case.

There is no conflict between this case and any of the cases that Ms. Santisteban raises. Nor does this case raise a significant constitutional issue or an issue of substantial public importance. The Court should deny Ms. Santisteban's petition for review.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly determine that the superior court's order was void when the court did not have personal jurisdiction over DSHS?

2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly decline to reach Ms. Santisteban's constitutional issues when the court resolved the case on procedural grounds?

3. Did the Court of Appeals correctly determine that DSHS could appeal as an "aggrieved party" under RAP 3.1 and that DSHS met the criteria for discretionary review under RAP 2.3?

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Superior Court Entered an Order Conditionally Releasing Ms. Santisteban and Included Requirements that DSHS Pay for Services

Ms. Santisteban was acquitted as not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) of the crime of Murder in the 2nd degree in 1998. CP 581, 854-55.

In November 2023, Ms. Santisteban submitted an application to DSHS for conditional release from Western State Hospital. CP 582. In March 2024, she petitioned the superior court for an order conditionally releasing her into the community under RCW 10.77.150. CP 582. In May 2024, after performing

an assessment of Ms. Santisteban, DSHS determined that she did not meet functional eligibility criteria for funding of adult family home services. CP 585.

Unbeknownst to DSHS until just days before the hearing, the prosecutor and defense attorney intended to file an agreed conditional release order for Ms. Santisteban's release to an adult family home funded by DSHS. On the court day prior to that hearing, Ms. Santisteban filed a memorandum opposing DSHS being heard on any issues, arguing that the statute "does not provide that an assistant attorney general shall or should appear at a conditional release hearing," that the statute "does not require the Court to consider whether or not DSHS wants to pay for a conditional release." CP 845.

On September 23, 2024, the prosecution and defense presented the agreed order to the superior court conditionally releasing Ms. Santisteban from confinement at a DSHS facility. Verbatim Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1 (RP1) 4:6-8, Sept. 23, 2024. The order directed that she be discharged to an

adult family home by October 23, 2024. CP 596. Although an Assistant Attorney General appeared at the hearing to object, RP1 11-12, the superior court ruled that because DSHS had not timely intervened to become a party through a written motion, it was not entitled to be heard on any of the issues. RP1 16-18. But the parties had never served DSHS with any motions related to the entry of the agreed order and the record is wholly absent of any proof of service, or other evidence that the proposed order was served on DSHS.

The order, entered under the conditional release procedures of former RCW 10.77.150 (recodified as RCW 10.77.550)[1], imposed conditions for Ms. Santisteban's conditional release to a less restrictive alternative setting in the

[1] Effective July 27, 2025, the majority of RCW 10.77 was recodified. Laws of 2025, ch. 358, § 2(1). Ms. Santisteban references various statutes in RCW 10.77, such as RCW 10.77.2009, that do not exist in the Revised Code of Washington but rather exist only in Westlaw's Revised Code of Washington Annotated. For citations to the new, recodified 10.77, this brief cites to the official Revised Code of Washington. *See* RCW 1.08.037, .040.

community and identified the services that Ms. Santisteban would be required to participate in, as contemplated by RCW 10.77.550(3)(c) and former RCW 10.77.175 (recodified as RCW 10.77.575). CP 590. In addition to the findings contemplated by these statutes, the superior court included additional findings and conclusions in the order that required DSHS to make specific payments to support the release. CP 589-90. The superior court concluded that DSHS has a legal obligation to pay for Ms. Santisteban to be served in an adult family home under former RCW 10.77.250 (recodified as RCW 10.77.129), despite being previously found to be ineligible for these services through the long-term care program provided through DSHS Home and Community Services (HCS). CP 589-90.

The superior court also found that while DSHS had "discretion" to identify a funding source within its budget, that HCS "should pay the cost of all aspects of this conditional release order and the conditions below in light of the parties' stipulation

that the HCS incorrectly found Ms. Santisteban ineligible for that funding in the first place and based upon the accompanying records herein." CP 590-91. These costs would be ongoing and indefinite. CP 590-91. Based on a report submitted by Ms. Santisteban's social worker, DSHS would be required to pay a daily rate of $235 to the adult family home and was also required to pay up to $525 per week to provide Ms. Santisteban full-time escort services. CP 590, 825.

DSHS timely filed an appeal of the September 23, 2024, order. CP 319-20. DSHS then sought an emergency stay of the portions of the superior court order that required DSHS to pay for services but did not seek to stay the portions of the order finding Ms. Santisteban appropriate for release. The commissioner granted the stay and set this matter for expedited review. Commissioner's Ruling Granting Emergency Stay and Accelerating Review, Oct. 31, 2024. Ms. Santisteban then moved for dismissal on the grounds that DSHS is not a party and is not allowed to appeal. In the alternative, she asked the court to

recharacterize DSHS's notice of appeal as a notice of discretionary review. The Court of Appeals commissioner denied the motion but allowed Ms. Santisteban to contest DSHS's ability to seek review in her brief of respondent. Letter from the Court of Appeals, Division I, Dec. 23, 2024.

Meanwhile, with the assistance of DSHS, a different release plan was developed and Ms. Santisteban discharged to the community under that plan in October 2024. CP 2-19. This alternative plan was funded by a program for which Ms. Santisteban was found eligible. CP 4.

B. The Court of Appeals Reversed the Superior Court and Vacated the Challenged Portions of the Order as Void

The Court of Appeals reversed the challenged portions of the superior court's order as void for lack of personal jurisdiction over DSHS. *State v. Santisteban*, No. 87313-0, 2025 WL 1733044, at *4-*5 (Wash. Ct. App. June 23, 2025) (unpublished). The court also concluded that because DSHS was "erroneously deprived of the opportunity to be heard in the

superior court," there was not a sufficient record to review the merits of the issue of whether RCW 10.77.129 requires DSHS to fund treatment in a less restrictive alternative placement. *Id.* at *2.

The court also held that discretionary review was appropriate in this case because DSHS is an "aggrieved party" whose pecuniary rights were substantially affected, allowing for appellate review under RAP 3.1. *Id.* at *3 (citing *State v. G.A.H.*, 133 Wn. App. 567, 574-75, 137 P.3d 66 (2006)). Further, the court held that DSHS did not need to move to intervene prior to appeal, because "[a] requirement that a nonparty, who is not given timely notice of the proceeding until they inquire, and is not involved in the day-to-day litigation, should have the foresight to know that its interests will be litigated in absentia, and thus timely intervene, is backwards." *Id.* at *3. Additionally, although review as a matter of right under RAP 2.2 was not appropriate in this case, the court concluded that DSHS did meet

the criteria for discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(2) and granted discretionary review. *Id.* at *4.

Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the superior court erred in reviewing HCS's determination of ineligibility for benefits without following the mandatory procedures of the APA, RCW 34.05. *Id.* at *5.

DSHS moved for publication, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion finding that the opinion was "not of precedential value." Order Denying Mot. to Publish at 1, July 23, 2025. Ms. Santisteban now petitions this Court for review.

IV. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE DENIED

A. The Decision by the Court of Appeals Does Not Conflict with Other Decisions

1. The decision by the Court of Appeals that personal jurisdiction is required to order a nonparty to act does not conflict with a decision of the Court of Appeals

Under RAP 13.4(b), this Court will accept review only if certain enumerated criteria are met. Ms. Santisteban first

contends that the unpublished Court of Appeals opinion conflicts with "cases recognizing that state agencies have obligations imposed by the legislature that are independent of court orders" that exist "regardless of whether a particular court exercises *in personam* jurisdiction over the agency" such as *Pierce County v. State*, 144 Wn. App. 783, 185 P.3d 594 (2008), *as amended on denial of reconsideration* (July 15, 2008) and *Gronquist v. Washington State Dep't of Licensing*, 175 Wn. App. 729, 309 P.3d 538 (2013). Pet. for Review at 34-35; *see also* RAP 13.4(b)(1)-(2).

It is unclear what the alleged conflict with *Pierce County* and *Gronquist* would be as there are no overlapping issues between those cases and the decision below. Perhaps even more importantly on the issue of personal jurisdiction, the state agencies involved in *Pierce County* and *Gronquist* were parties at the trial court. *Pierce County*, 144 Wn. App. at 800-01; *Gronquist*, 175 Wn. App. at 736.

To the extent the alleged conflict is the general proposition that the legislature can create requirements for a state agency to fulfill, nothing in the decision below is to the contrary and DSHS has never argued against this proposition.

DSHS acknowledges that there are some statutes that impose obligations that do not require a court to obtain personal jurisdiction prior to ordering a state agency to act. *See, e.g.*, Appellant's Opening Br. at 21, Dec. 31, 2024. But as *G.A.H.* recognizes, a court can order a state agency to act without acquiring personal jurisdiction *only* if it has specific statutory authority to do so. *G.A.H.*, 133 Wn. App at 577-78. DSHS further acknowledges that RCW 10.77 imposes specific statutory duties that, under certain circumstances, might allow a superior court to order DSHS to act without DSHS being made a party to the case. But here, although the superior court invoked RCW 10.77.129 and .550 as a basis to bind DSHS, CP 589-90, neither of those statutes provide a basis to require that DSHS pay for the community-based services included in the order. Accordingly,

the superior court needed to obtain personal jurisdiction over DSHS before it ordered DSHS to assume a duty it is not statutorily obligated to perform, and the Court of Appeals correctly applied *G.A.H.* Therefore, review under RAP 13.4(b)(1) is not warranted on this issue.

2. An alleged conflict with a United States Supreme Court Case is not a basis for review

Additionally, this case in no way conflicts with *Youngberg v. Romeo,* 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1982), nor is conflict with a United States Supreme Court case an enumerated criteria for review under RAP 13.4. Pet. for Review at 35. Even if it were, this case is not in conflict with *Youngberg*. In *Youngberg*, the United States Supreme Court concluded that involuntarily committed persons have a right to safe conditions, freedom from bodily restraint, and "minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint." 457 U.S. at 319. However, the Court of Appeals correctly declined to reach Ms. Santisteban's contention that the superior court violated her

substantive due process rights when it decided the case on procedural grounds. *Santisteban,* 2025 WL 1733044, at *5 n.4. Because the Court of Appeals did not reach these issues, this case cannot conflict with *Youngberg*. Thus, this alleged conflict does not warrant review by this Court.

3. The decision by the Court of Appeals that a nonparty can appeal as an "aggrieved party" under RAP 3.1 does not conflict with a decision of the Court of Appeals

Contrary to Ms. Santisteban's argument, this case does not conflict with *Aguirre v. AT & T Wireless Services*, 109 Wn. App. 80, 33 P.3d 1110 (2001), or any other unidentified "cases noting that nonparties may not seek relief though the Rules of Appellate Procedure." Pet. for Review at 35.

This case is not in conflict with *Aguirre* because *Aguirre* arises under materially different circumstances. In that case, the nonparty (Sanders) had opted out of a settlement but made various arguments related to the equity of the settlement agreement. *Aguirre*, 109 Wn. App. at 85. The Court of Appeals concluded that Sanders had no standing to object to the

settlement, that she was not a party because she opted out of the settlement, and the settlement had "no effect on her proprietary, pecuniary, or personal rights and she has no standing to appeal." *Id.* at 85. This is materially different from the present case where the Court of Appeals concluded that DSHS was an "aggrieved party" *because* of its affected pecuniary rights.

It is true that in *Aguirre*, the Court of Appeals wrote that "[t]hose who are not parties to an action may not appeal." Pet. for Review at 35; *Aguirre*, 109 Wn. App. at 85 (citing *In re Guardianship of Lasky*, 54 Wn. App. 841, 850, 776 P.2d 695 (1989)). But this isolated dicta is an oversimplification of the holding in *Lasky*, the case that it cited. In *Lasky*, the Court of Appeals concluded that a nonparty attorney *could* appeal an order regarding attorney fees and CR 11 sanctions that "substantially affected a pecuniary right to fees" as an "aggrieved party." *Id.* at 848. The court went on to clarify that the nonparty attorney could *not* appeal from an order "removing him as guardian and dismissing the Trust action"

because he "ha[d] no interest in the guardianship or Trust estate other than for compensation due to him." *Id.* at 850. Thus, he could only appeal from the order denying fees and imposing sanctions as a nonparty. *Id.*

The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the *Lasky* holding in *G.A.H.*, and the court then applied it to the present case. In *G.A.H.*, the trial court ordered DSHS, a nonparty, "to assume custodial and financial responsibility for G.A.H.'s welfare." 133 Wn. App. at 575. Interpreting RAP 3.1's "aggrieved party" requirement, the Court of Appeals held that the challenged order "directly affected the rights of DSHS" and "[a]ccordingly, DSHS is an aggrieved party." *Id.*

The present case is materially similar. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "[h]ere, the superior court ordered DSHS to assume financial responsibility for all the expenses related to [Ms.] Santisteban's placement at an adult family services home. Accordingly, DSHS is an aggrieved party with a

substantial pecuniary interest affected by the court's decision." *Santisteban*, 2025 WL 1733044, at *3.

The Court of Appeals also correctly concluded that *G.A.H.* does not require intervention prior to appealing as an aggrieved party, nor does CR 24 impose on nonparties a requirement to monitor a case they have not been served formal notice on in order to intervene if their rights will be adjudicated. *Santisteban*, 2025 WL 1733044, at *3. The court noted that "[a] requirement that a nonparty, who is not given timely notice of the proceeding until they inquire, and is not involved in the day-to-day litigation, should have the foresight to know that its interests will be litigated in absentia, and thus timely intervene, is backwards." *Id.*

Contrary to Ms. Santisteban's argument, the opinion below does not "open[] the floodgates for appeals from any nonparties who believe they are impacted by a court decision." Pet. for Review at 33. The Court of Appeals correctly applied precedent to hold that a nonparty must be *aggrieved*, meaning that they are actually impacted by the court decision, in order to

appeal. The Court of Appeals opinion does not allow appeals from "any" nonparty who "believe[s]" they are impacted. In addition, rather than "undermin[ing] the incentives to intervention" this rule encourages parties to join interested nonparties in the litigation so as to not litigate a nonparty's rights without that nonparty present to defend their interests. Pet. for Review at 33. Foreclosing any appeal by a nonparty, even those whose pecuniary interests have been substantially affected by a court order entered without obtaining personal jurisdiction over the nonparty, incentivizes litigants to craft agreed orders that benefit the parties while depriving the nonparty of due process and without recourse to protect its rights. Review under RAP 13.4(b)(1) is not warranted on this issue.

B. The Decision by the Court of Appeals to Not Reach Issues Related to Due Process Does Not Raise a Significant Constitutional Issue

This case does not present a significant issue of constitutional law under RAP 13.4(b)(3) because the Court of Appeals correctly declined to reach the merits of

Ms. Santisteban's due process issue when it instead decided the case on procedural grounds. Ms. Santisteban contends that review is warranted because in reversing the superior court's order, the Court of Appeals "has allowed bureaucratic obstacles to override a committed person's right to less restrictive treatment grounded in professional judgment." Pet for Review at 35. This conclusory statement is not supported by any citation to the record, nor has this allegation been explored such that there could be a record in the trial court.

Further relying on *Youngberg*, Ms. Santisteban claims "the court violated her right to substantive due process" because she was placed in a different treatment facility than the one in the September 23, 2024 order. Pet. for Review at 25-26 (citing *Youngberg*, 457 U.S. at 322). She also claims that this case raises the constitutional issue of "whether a person committed under RCW 10.77 retains a due process right to treatment based on professional judgment." Pet. for Review at 36.

DSHS does not dispute that committed people retain certain due process rights related to treatment. However, this does not equate to a right to placement in a specific less restrictive alternative, at a specific time, and for the placement to be funded by DSHS in the absence of statutory authority or budgetary appropriations, as Ms. Santisteban implies.

Ms. Santisteban was released to a less restrictive alternative under the October 2024 order that she did not appeal. If Ms. Santisteban believes that she is constitutionally entitled to a different placement instead of her current community setting, she can raise that issue in the proper forum. This issue is not before this Court: there is no record on the issue of a potential constitutional violation, this issue was not meaningfully raised or considered at the trial court, and the Court of Appeals declined to reach the issue. There is simply no present constitutional issue for this Court to review.

Contrary to Ms. Santisteban's assertion, the Court of Appeals decision does not "allow[] one faction of DSHS to

unilaterally veto such treatment based on reasons unrelated to professional judgment." Pet. for Review at 36. At no point in this litigation has DSHS challenged the portions of the order related to Ms. Santisteban's treatment. Instead, DSHS sought to ensure that superior courts do not overturn a determination of ineligibility for benefits without following the APA and force DSHS to pay for services not contemplated by statute. An agency's determination of ineligibility for benefits does not amount to a unilateral veto of treatment. To the extent that Ms. Santisteban disagreed with the HCS determination that she was ineligible for benefits, she could have sought review under the APA, but she did not. The Court of Appeal's decision requiring that litigants follow the mandatory procedures of the APA does not "violate[] federal constitutional guarantees." Pet. for Review at 36.

Ms. Santisteban does not raise a significant issue of constitutional law that should be decided by this Court. Review of this issue under RAP 13.4(b)(3) is not warranted.

C. The Unpublished Decision by the Court of Appeals Does Not Raise an Issue of Substantial Public Interest That Should be Determined by the Supreme Court

This case does not present an issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by this Court under RAP 13.4(b)(4) because the Court of Appeals correctly reaffirmed the basic principle that a court must have personal jurisdiction over a nonparty to order that nonparty to act. Contrary to Ms. Santisteban's assertion, this opinion does not "permit[] an executive agency to frustrate judicially approved mental health treatment." Pet. for Review at 36. As discussed, DSHS in no way challenges the proposed mental health treatment in the conditional release order. Rather, DSHS challenges that a superior court can force DSHS to pay for conditional release services when that payment is not contemplated by statute, is not part of the legislative budget appropriations, and the superior court did not have personal jurisdiction over DSHS. DSHS not funding services not contemplated by statute does not "rais[e] separation of powers

concerns and undermin[e] the integrity of RCW 10.77's conditional release system." Pet. for Review at 36-37. Instead, the superior court, in ordering payment outside of the appropriations that are distinctly in the purview of the Legislature, violated separation of powers and undermined the system. *See In re Welfare of J.H.*, 75 Wn. App. 887, 894, 880 P.2d 1030 (1994) (holding the court must limit its incursion into the legislative realm in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers).

In the present case, the Court of Appeals "decline[d] to reach the statutory limitations on DSHS's funding obligations." *Santisteban*, 2025 WL 1733044, at *2. Instead, the court concluded that "because DSHS was erroneously deprived of the opportunity to be heard in the superior court, a record was never created supporting review on the merits in this court." *Id.* Therefore, the court correctly remanded this case to the superior court for further proceedings.

Even if the superior court had obtained personal jurisdiction over DSHS, the plain language of RCW 10.77.129(1) only obligates DSHS to pay for *inpatient* treatment, not treatment or services under a less restrictive alternative in the community, nor treatment for the entirety of a person's commitment.

When interpreting a statute, "[t]he court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's intent, and if the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent." *Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C.*, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). In determining the plain meaning of the statute, this Court examines the statute in which the provision is found, as well as related statutes. *Id.* at 9-12. Under RCW 10.77.129, which sets forth responsibilities for certain costs under RCW 10.77, "the department shall be responsible for all costs relating to the

evaluation and *inpatient treatment* of persons committed to it[.]" RCW 10.77.129(1) (emphasis added).

Merriam-Webster defines "inpatient" as "a hospital patient who receives lodging and food as well as treatment."[2] Although not defining "inpatient" as an adjective, it follows that a core tenet of "inpatient" treatment is that it occurs in a hospital setting. This definition is consistent with other statutes in RCW 10.77, as well as materially similar statutes under the Involuntary Treatment Act, RCW 71.05. For example, under RCW 10.77.010(4), "'Commitment' means the determination by a court that a person should be detained for a period of either evaluation or treatment, or both, in an inpatient *or* a less-restrictive setting." RCW 10.77.010(4) (emphasis added). The inclusion of "or" in the definition demonstrates that, in the context of RCW 10.77, the Legislature has made the specific

[2] *Inpatient*, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inpatient (last visited Sept. 8, 2025) (emphasis added).

decision to delineate inpatient treatment from treatment in a less-restrictive setting.

This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the Legislature addressed the responsibility for costs for conditional release to less restrictive services through a different controlling statute, RCW 71.24.035(5)(l). That statute directs the Health Care Authority to require "behavioral health administrative services organizations and managed care organizations, as applicable, to provide services as identified in RCW 71.05.585 and 10.77.575 to individuals committed for involuntary treatment under less restrictive alternative court orders[.]" RCW 71.24.035(5)(l). RCW 10.77.575, in part, sets out the services and supports that can be court-ordered for an NGRI patient in a less restrictive setting. In contrast to RCW 10.77.129(1), which makes no reference to conditional releases or less restrictive alternative placements, RCW 71.24.035(5)(l) expressly places the responsibility on the Health Care Authority to contract with the behavioral health

administrative service organizations and managed care organizations to provide those services. But DSHS was not given an opportunity to fully develop and present these arguments to the trial court. Nor is there a Court of Appeals determination on the merits of this issue for the Court to review.

The Court of Appeals correctly applying long-standing concepts related to personal jurisdiction does not "have broad consequences for patients, treatment providers, courts, and agencies across the state." Pet. for Review at 37. Instead, it reaffirms that, in the absence of a legislative directive, state agencies are subject to the same personal jurisdiction requirements as any other litigant.

Ms. Santisteban has failed to meet the burden to show review should be granted under RAP 13.4(b)(4). There is no issue of substantial public interest that warrants review in this case.

V. CONCLUSION

This Court should deny the petition for review. The unpublished decision below is not in conflict with the cases Ms. Santisteban identifies and the petition for review does not raise an issue of substantial public interest or a significant constitutional issue that should be decided by this Court.

This document contains 4,552 words, excluding the parts of the document exempted from the word count by RAP 18.17.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of September, 2025.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, *Holly McClure*, state and declare as follows:

I am a citizen of the United States of America and over the age of 18 years and I am competent to testify to the matters set forth herein. I certify that on September 15, 2025, I served a true and correct copy of this **ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW** and this **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** on the following parties to this action, as indicated below:

Counsel for Petitioner:
Jodi Backlund
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PO Box 6490
Olympia, WA 98507

☒ Via COA Portal: backlundmistry@gmail.com

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 15th day of September 2025, at Olympia, Washington.

HOLLY MCCLURE
Paralegal

SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES DIVISION, ATTORNEY GENERALS OFFICE

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Transmittal Information

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